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Previewsby which the brain orchestrates region-
specific dopamine signaling. Just as
importantly, the finding that dopamine
neuron responses track cognitive func-
tion could prove to be valuable for our
understanding of Parkinson’s disease, in
which dopaminergic medications used
for the control of motor symptoms are
sometimes accompanied by cognitive
side effects. Further work delineating
the separate cognitive, motor, and
learning signals in the SNc and VTA
might eventually lead to better treat-
ments that preferentially target dopa-
mine’s role in movement while sparing
patients’ cognitive abilities. Yet much re-
mains to be done. For a long while yet, it
appears, the tiny dopaminergic midbrainwill continue to demand a large body
of work.
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Visual objects tend to be found in predictable combinations (e.g., pens with paper). How does the brain
represent these regularities? In this issue of Neuron, Stansbury et al. (2013) use fMRI to study the brain’s
representation of visual scene categories.In a 1942 essay, Jorge Luis Borges
discusses the categorization of animals,
purportedly found in a fictitious Chinese
encyclopedia named the ‘‘Celestial
Empire of Benevolent Knowledge’’
(Borges, 1942). Animals therein are
classified into 14 fanciful categories,
including, ‘‘fabulous ones,’’ ‘‘those that
have just broken the flower vase,’’ and
‘‘those that look like flies when viewed
from a distance.’’ Borges uses this
example to suggest that any attempt
to categorize the contents of nature is
‘‘arbitrary and full of conjectures.’’
Nevertheless (again quoting Borges),
‘‘the impossibility of penetrating the
divine scheme of the universe cannot
dissuade us from outlining human
schemes, even though we are aware
that they are provisional.’’ In fact, such
schemes can be quite useful in sensoryneuroscience. A decade after Borges’s
essay, Barlow (1953) discovered neurons
that respond selectively to stimuli that
look like flies when viewed from a dis-
tance. These ‘‘fly detectors’’ were found
in the retinas of frogs and, hence, were
linked to a specific category of behavior
(feeding). Subsequently, Hubel and
Wiesel (1962) identified visual cortical
cells that were described as ‘‘simple’’
and ‘‘complex,’’ and these turned out to
be useful labels for understanding many
aspects of the visual cortex from anatomy
to computation.
More recent imaging studies have led
to the suggestion that neurons with
particular stimulus selectivities are clus-
tered together, forming brain modules
responsible for encoding rather abstract
categories of stimuli, including faces
(Tsao et al., 2006), places (Epstein andKanwisher, 1998), and buildings (Hasson
et al., 2003). Of course, the number of
such categories must be far greater than
the number of brain regions, which leads
to the profound question of how the brain
organizes such a vast quantity of visual
experience. In this issue of Neuron,
Stansbury et al. (2013) address this
question.
Stansbury et al. (2013) used fMRI
imaging of human subjects to study the
brain’s representation of visual scene
categories, defined as classes of images
that contain similar co-occurrences of
individual objects. For example, a scene
that contains a building and a car is
more likely to belong to the category
‘‘cityscape’’ than to the category
‘‘nautical.’’ Obviously, one object (e.g.,
a tree) can be found in more than one
scene (e.g., cityscape and rural), andeptember 4, 2013 ª2013 Elsevier Inc. 833
Figure 1. Estimating Categories from Natural Images
Human observers derive lists of objects from natural images (left). A generative
model (right) specifies that these lists of objects are generated by weighted
mixtures of features, which, in this case, are categories. The parameters of
the model—the word probabilities corresponding to each category as well
as the category vector corresponding to each image—are learned by the latent
Dirichlet allocation algorithm.
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Previewsone scene (e.g., a harbor) can
belong to more than one
scene category (e.g., city-
scape and nautical). Thus,
part of the challenge
of understanding the brain’s
representation of scene cate-
gories is in understanding the
organization of the cate-
gories themselves.
To this end, Stansbury
et al. (2013) have adopted
an elegant approach that de-
fines the scene categories
objectively with an algorithm
that detects the presence of
certain combinations of ob-
jects in a large database
of natural scenes. Impor-
tantly, the algorithm is not
given any prior information
about which categories each
scene belongs to; it defines
categories on the basis of
statistical regularities. This
approach largely circum-vents Borges’s problem of the arbitrari-
ness of categories, given that the
classification is defined by the images
themselves rather than being imposed
by the person doing the analysis.
In this approach, each scene (Figure 1,
left) was tagged with a list of objects
(e.g., two boats, one car, one person,
etc.; Figure 1, middle) identified by human
observers. These descriptors were fed
to an unsupervised learning algorithm
known as latent Dirichlet allocation
(LDA), which inferred the categories
represented in the data set on the basis
of the pattern of co-occurrences of
objects (Blei et al., 2003).
LDA, which has its root in text classifi-
cation, is one of a number of unsupervised
learning techniques that aim to uncover
structure in complex data. Typically,
they define each example in the data
set—e.g., a list of words, an image, or a
sound—as being generated by a noisy,
weighted mixture of features. Optionally,
they define a set of soft constraints,
or priors, on the distribution of features
and weights. The goal of the learning
algorithm is to find a set of features
and weights that captures the bulk of
the variation in the data set while
respecting the prior assumptions of the
algorithm.834 Neuron 79, September 4, 2013 ª2013 ElIn LDA, each scene descriptor is
assumed to be generated by a mixture
of categories—the features (Figure 1,
right). LDA assumes that the weights
associated with this mixture (Figure 1,
red arrows) are sparse—each scene con-
tains only a handful of categories. It also
assumes that weights are positive—
whereas a scene may belong to a cate-
gory (positive weight; indicated by a red
arrow in Figure 1) or not (zero weight). It
is not meaningful to say that a scene be-
longs negatively to a category (negative
weight). The ensemble of weights linking
a scene to each scene category is called
the scene’s category vector.
This sparse, positive encoding scheme
allows the algorithm to leverage parts-
based or combinatorial coding (e.g.,
both nautical and cityscape) in order to
describe more narrowly defined scenes
(e.g., harbor; Figure 1, middle). Each cate-
gory is itself a sparse, positive mixture of
objects (Figure 1, right).
These assumptions are embedded
within a hierarchical, probabilistic model;
objects contained within each category
and the categories contained within
each scene are jointly estimated by
Bayesian inference. The resulting cate-
gories contained a high proportion of
related objects. For example, one cate-sevier Inc.gory assigned the highest
weights for highway, car,
sky, vehicle, and signpost—
most likely corresponding to
highways or ground transpor-
tation. Furthermore, the
model assigned intuitive cate-
gories to the scenes in the
database, tagging a harbor
scene with nautical and city-
scape categories. This is not
surprising, given that LDA
and its extensions have
proven widely applicable in
an analogous problem, deter-
mining categories from text
documents (Blei et al., 2003).
The LDA approach taken by
Stansbury et al. (2013) has re-
vealed hidden structure in
natural images, but does the
visual system exploit this
structure in its representation
of visual scenes? One way to
answer this question is to
ask whether some aspect ofbrain activity correlates systematically
with scene categories during the viewing
of natural images. This would suggest
that the brain encodes the scene cate-
gories in the same way that previous
work has suggested an encoding of faces
or orientations.
To tackle this question, Stansbury et al.
(2013) had subjects view a variety of
different scenes and simultaneously
recorded their brain activity with fMRI.
Then, the authors attempted to predict
the BOLD response in each voxel under
the assumption that the response to a
scene was given by a weighted sum of
the scene’s category vector.
Responses in low-level striate and
extrastriate visual areas, which are sen-
sitive to elementary features such as
orientation and contrast, were poorly
modulated by scene category. However,
responses in anterior visual areas such
as the fusiform face area (FFA) and the
parahippocampal place area (PPA) could
be accurately predicted by the encoding
model. The authors found that the pre-
dictions were most accurate when the
LDA model contained 20 categories and
850 objects, indicating that there is sub-
stantially more categorical information
available at the macroscopic fMRI scale
than previously appreciated.
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PreviewsImportantly, the number of voxels
significantly predicted by the category-
encoding model was larger than alterna-
tive models relying on elementary visual
features, such as orientation or spatial
frequency. This was a crucial test of the
hypothesis that high-level visual areas
actually represent scene categories
rather than visual stimuli per se (Malach
et al., 1995). Consistent with this idea,
the model was also significantly more
accurate than others that relied only on
the presence of individual objects.
Category preferences in different areas
were, to some degree, consistent with
previous literature. For example, the FFA
showed a relative preference for the
portraits category, whereas the PPA was
most selective for categories that could
be labeled ‘‘places.’’ However, the results
of this analysis indicated a more complex
relationship between brain regions and
category selectivity: voxels in several
anterior visual areas showed selectivity
for other categories. For example, the
FFA was selective for the ‘‘plants’’ cate-
gory in addition to ‘‘portraits.’’ These re-
sults are consistent with earlier results
from the same group, which highlighted
the presence of a distributed representa-
tion of categories with smooth, overlap-
ping gradients of preferred categories
along certain cortical directions (Huth
et al., 2012).
A second way to test the idea that
scene categories are represented in spe-
cific brain regions is to ask whether it is
possible to decode the category viewed
by the observer on the basis of the
BOLD activity alone. This approach is
similar to that used by the same group
to demonstrate how the brain represents
specific images and objects (Naselaris
et al., 2011). The authors found that
BOLD activity successfully predicted the
category membership of individual im-
ages. Importantly, these images were
of novel scenes that were not used toformulate the encoding model, indicating
that the model generalized beyond the
specific exemplars on which it was
trained.
Then, they used the LDA model to suc-
cessfully predict the objects present in
individual images on the basis of pre-
dicted category membership alone. This
is quite a remarkable result given that
objects are only encoded in the model
indirectly through their correlation with
scene categories. The success of this
decoding approach implies that the dis-
tribution of objects in natural scenes
contains substantial structure and that
this structure can be exploited by the
visual system.
These results might help to explain
previous psychophysical findings that
indicate that, when the gist of a scene is
understood, objects within it can be
recognized accurately even at extremely
low resolutions, in some cases as low
as 6 3 6 pixels (Torralba, 2009). Perfor-
mance in these tasks becomes worse
when objects are isolated from their
context. Similarly, human observers can
detect an object more efficiently when it
is found within a contextually consistent
scene than when it is not (Biederman
et al., 1973). Evidently, the problem of
inferring object identity from low-level
visual features is made much easier by
context. Much like low-level how vision
can make use of prior information to
accurately estimate motion direction
from noisy observations (Weiss et al.,
2002), high-level vision could make use
of learned statistical regularities to
estimate object identity in ambiguous
scenes (Lee and Mumford, 2003).
More generally, the approach devel-
oped by Stansbury et al. (2013) may
provide an objective way to probe
the brain’s representation of abstract
sensory information. Scene categories
are abstract, in that they are largely inde-
pendent of specific image features,Neuron 79, Sbut could they even be independent of
vision? Would the sounds of traffic and
the smell of baked goods produce the
same activation as pictures of a city
street? Perhaps sensory stimulation is
not necessary at all: could imagining a
specific type of scene produce inter-
pretable activation in the relevant brain
regions? Such representations might
ultimately facilitate the extraction of even
more abstract, perhaps semantic, infor-
mation from brain activity.
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